The paper analyzes the relation between monetary uncertainty and government incentives to implement economic reforms in order to reduce structural distortions and make economies more flexible. It is shown that uncertainty about the central bank's behavior leads to more reforms. I relate this result to the debate about central bank structure in a larger European monetary union.
INTRODUCTION
Faced with the enlargement of the monetary union to new member states, it is often argued that a successful integration of new members requires nominal and real convergence to present member states [European Central Bank (ECB), 2004] . A monetary union with members too diverse will make the task of the ECB more difficult and member states more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks because monetary policy cannot react to idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, individual economies must become more flexible in response to economic shocks, and the question is whether monetary union will induce more or less convergence. 1 Another current challenge for the ECB is that it is often criticized for being, compared with other major central banks in developed countries, relatively nontransparent and opaque. However, in making such statements the ECB is compared with national central banks. So another question is whether the same degree of transparency is adequate in a monetary union which is, in addition, in the process of enlargement and becoming more asymmetric. Thus, is there a connection between the degree of transparency of the central bank and the process of convergence in an asymmetric monetary union?
Distinguishing between structural distortions and measures that increase the flexibility of the economy, I show that the introduction of a monetary union tends to have different effects on member countries. Generally, governments have an incentive to make their economies more flexible in response to shocks because the common central bank can no longer react to idiosyncratic economic shocks. However, the incentives for governments to reduce structural distortions are lowered in the more distorted economies, whereas the less distorted economies implement more reforms. Monetary union is thus likely to lead to a further polarization between more and less distorted economies, making the conduct of monetary policy presumably more difficult. These problems will become even more severe in a larger monetary union. I also find, however, that the negative effects of an extension of the monetary union for some countries can be mitigated. Uncertainty about the central bank's reaction function increases the incentives for governments to implement more reforms, thus establishing a so far overlooked relation between structural policies and monetary policy uncertainty. If governments can no longer rely on the central bank's response to economic shocks and structural problems, they provide more reform efforts. A not fully predictable central bank can, hence, compensate for the negative effects from European monetary union (EMU) extension on structural distortions. This might be one reason why it could be optimal for a common central bank to be less transparent than a national central bank. 2 Besides deliberately increasing opaqueness in a larger monetary union, there is another way to introduce some degree of uncertainty. Applied to the extension of EMU, it is likely that a larger monetary union will, at least initially, be accompanied by an increase in uncertainty about the larger central bank's reaction because a larger policy-making body is less predictable and has not yet been able to establish a reputation. And because uncertainty is presumably a function of the political weights of different countries, the results have also implications for the discussion about the ECB's structure. Uncertainty is likely to be higher if new member states have a high voting weight and vice versa. While making sense from an efficiency point of view, current plans of centralizing the decision-making power and reducing the number of policy-makers in the ECB council by introducing a system of rotation can, hence, be detrimental to reform incentives in a larger monetary union. 3 The paper is related to several strings in the literature. First, Calmfors (2001) and Sibert and Sutherland (2000) argued that monetary union makes countries less reform-willing because monetary policy and economic reforms are considered to be partial substitutes. Inflation-averse governments have an incentive to deregulate in order to keep inflation low, but in a monetary union the inflationary response to distortions in one economy is lower and therefore governments run a more distionary policy. 4 But this is not necessarily true for countries that enter a monetary union with relatively more distorted countries. In order to avoid an increase in inflation, less distorted countries even increase their reforms.
Second, I draw on the literature on the influence of monetary policy uncertainty (Brainard, 1967; Söderström, 2002) . Most of that literature deals with the consequences of uncertainty on the central bank's policy, showing that monetary authorities tend to be more careful if faced with parameter uncertainty, such as the transmission of monetary policy. My focus is how uncertainty about the central bank's behavior influences domestic agents. The question whether transparency is beneficial is usually analyzed in relation to the private sector, where several authors have pointed out that some degree of opaqueness and 'creative ambiguity' can be beneficial for the economy (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986; Hefeker, 2008) . 5 I analyze how governments react to such uncertainty.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on the design of the common central bank. Most authors argue that because of efficiency considerations it is highly unlikely that an even larger ECB council will be able to make efficient and speedy policy decisions. Moreover, it can be expected that national representatives vote with a national perspective (Baldwin et al., 2001; Meade and Sheets, 2005; Ullrich, 2004) . It is feared that new member states will distort the ECB's decision, given that many of these countries are economically small but politically over-represented (Berger, 2006) . In contrast to that literature, I argue there could also be a positive effect if enlargement creates more uncertainty.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the relation between economic reforms and uncertainty for a closed economy. Sections 3 and 4 discuss monetary union, and Section 5 concludes.
POLICY CHOICES IN THE CLOSED ECONOMY

The model
This section develops the underlying model and describes the interaction between a domestic government and a national central bank. The model is based on Sibert and Sutherland (2000) .
Output y i is a positive function of surprise inflation p i À p i e , where p i e is the rate of inflation expected by the private sector. Output is decreasing in structural distortions t i , such as distortionary taxation, the presence of monopolies, tariff protection or the impact of labor unions. 6 Moreover, the economy may be hit by exogenous shocks e i , with e i $ Nð0; s 2 e Þ, whose effect on output is given as g i e i . Making the economy more flexible by reducing labor and product market regulation can help the economy to adjust more quickly and thus cushion part of the shock. 7 The lower the level of such regulations g i , the lower will be the impact of exogenous developments and shocks. We hence have
Clearly, the first best situation would be reached if g i and t i could be reduced to zero. However, it is assumed that the economy is starting out with given levels of distortions,ĝ i andt i , and that deregulation is politically costly for the government. Abolishing labor market regulation may lead to protests, reducing subsidies may prompt firms to threat a loss of jobs and the reduction of taxes may imply the government is no longer able to finance pet projects. More regulation instead could lead to protests by employers and scare away foreign investors. Therefore, changes to the given level ofĝ i andt i risk alienating one or several interest groups. As in Sibert and Sutherland (2000) , I assume these political costs are increasing in deviations of g i and t i fromĝ i andt i with utility parameters f g and f t :
To focus on the economics of the model by abstracting from the influence of preferences, I assume that utility parameters are equal for all governments. Apart from wishing to minimize the political costs of reforms, the government aims to keep inflation close to zero and to avoid deviations of output from its natural level (whose log is normalized to zero). Its loss function, with E denoting expectations, is
The objective function of the monetary authority is akin to the government's preferences but without the losses stemming from economic reform. Independent central banks are not elected into office, much less exposed to public resistance against policies and unlikely to be made responsible for economic reforms. Thus, the central bank is only concerned with the output gap and inflation. Another difference is that the preference parameter of the national central bank could differ from that of the government by m i with À1rm i rl (see Ciccarone et al., 2007) . The national monetary authority's preferences are
I assume that the central bank sets its policy when possible uncertainties about economic shocks about the state of the economy have been resolved. The underlying logic is the assumption that the private sector can only sporadically adjust its wage demands (which are driven by expected inflation), and that the government's policy decisions are infrequent as well (demanding usually a time-consuming legislative process). Monetary policy decisions, in contrast, are taken frequently and can be adjusted on a daily basis. Thus, the central bank can react to shocks immediately, whereas the government and the private sector are not able to adjust wages and reaction immediately in response to shocks.
The formal time structure is thus: (i) the government sets the levels of regulation g i and t i and forms expectations about m i ; (ii) the private sector simultaneously forms rational expectations about inflation (E[p i ] 5 p i e ) and about m i ; (iii) the shock e i is realized; (iv) the central bank sets inflation p i ; and (v) output is realized. The government is the Stackelberg leader taking into account how the central bank is expected to react to its policy choices. The private sector plays Nash against the government and the central bank.
Uncertainty and reforms
The model is solved by backward induction. Optimization of the monetary authority's loss function with respect to inflation yields
The assumption is that the central bank's reaction is not perfectly predictable by the private sector. The private sector will form expectations about how the central bank reacts to economic developments, such as commodity price shocks, fiscal policy changes or wages, but this will, in general, not be perfectly predictable. In Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union r 2010 The Author German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik terms of the model, this is represented by the assumption m i $ Nð0; s 2 m Þ with 0rs 2 m rl. Hence, s m 2 5 0 for a fully predictable central bank. 8 Given these assumptions, the expected rate of inflation is Ep i 5 lt i . 9 Obviously, inflation is increasing in the central bank's concern for output stabilization l as it aims to compensate for the negative output effect of distortions.
Since government and private sector determine their actions simultaneously, I consider next the government. The government optimizes its structural reforms and the ability of the economy to digest shocks by taking the expected reaction of the central bank into account.
The level of structural distortions remaining after reforms is
The level of distortions after partial reforms is increasing in initial distortionst i and government aversion to reforms f t . It is decreasing in the government's concern for output l as distortions lower output, and in uncertainty about the central bank's behavior. The more uncertain is the reaction of the central bank (captured by s m 2 ), the more cautious is the government and the more reforms are implemented. Because of the concern with output and uncertainty, there will always be some structural reform, since t i <t i for all l40 and s m 2 40. The amount of rigidity, remaining after reforms, is given as
It is increasing in the initial level of rigidityĝ i and the aversion against flexibility f g , and decreasing in the variability of the economic shock e i , reflecting the fact that the government will make the economy more flexible if the variability of economic shocks is high. The uncertainty about the central bank's reaction and the variability of economic shocks reinforce each other. It is decreasing in l if 14s m 2 , reflecting again the government's concern for stabilizing output. 10 Again, there is always some reform as g i <ĝ i for all s e 2 40. The rate of inflation therefore is
8. Thus, uncertainty refers to the central bank's preferences, as in Canzoneri (1985) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) . An alternative way to model non-transparency is a non-observable employment target or control errors (see Faust and Svensson, 2001; Jensen, 2002) . 9. Because of the structure of the model, the private sector conditions its behavior on structural policies only. A more elaborate model could also take into account how the private sector reacts to the economy's capacity to absorb shocks. This would not change the interaction between government and monetary policy, however. 10. Recall that 0rs 2 m rl.
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German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik and output is
Both types of distortions are thus decreasing in the amount of uncertainty about the central bank's reaction. The higher is the uncertainty, the more the government will attempt to make the economy less vulnerable to shocks and to lower structural distortions. Thus, uncertainty is beneficial for inflation and output because the government's actions have a direct positive impact on economic performance and an improvement in the economic performance reduces incentives to use monetary policy. Moreover, a more flexible economy requires less active monetary policy in response to shocks.
The intuition for the result is quite straightforward as higher variability in the policy response of the central bank will increase the variability of inflation and output if the government does not compensate for it by reducing distortions and increasing flexibility. 11 By making the economy more flexible and by reducing structural distortions, there is less incentive for active monetary policy and hence less variability of inflation and output. 12
POLICY CHOICES IN THE MONETARY UNION
Having established the case of a single economy and the interaction between uncertainty and economic reforms, the question is how this is transformed in a monetary union. As argued above, uncertainty concerning the reaction function of the central bank is arguably more relevant in the case of EMU, and particular so with the prospect of enlargement. There are at present 16 national representatives of member states and a board comprising another six members. Extending this body to additional members will make decision making in the EMU more cumbersome and presumably less predictable than today. Extension means that new members will be added whose preferences are mostly unknown and who could shift the policy stance of the ECB. The interaction of a larger group of individuals in collective decision making might then lead to an outcome that is different from what the smaller ECB council had decided. 13 Especially in the initial years, it is thus likely that the larger central bank council will create more uncertainty than before. Given that markets need some time to assess the preferences of policy makers, they might expect new members to bring different preferences to the ECB board.
To keep matters simple, I consider a monetary union built of two countries. Country 1 could be thought of as representing current members of EMU, with country 2 being new members. Both groups have equal weights of 1/2 each. This is obviously a simplification, as in reality new members are relatively small in 11. This is obvious from looking at the variances for inflation and output before the government sets its policy choices. From (4) we have s 2 p ¼ s 2 m t 2 þ ð1 þ lÞ À2 ðl 2 þ s 2 m Þg 2 s 2 e and s 2 y ¼ s 2 m t 2 þ ð1 þ lÞ À2 ð1 þ s 2 m Þg 2 s 2 e . Clearly, both can be lowered by reducing t and g. 12. Taking the variances of (7) and (8) shows, however, that the government is unlikely to be able to avoid an increase in variability in inflation and output as s m 2 increases. 13. Goldberg and Klein (2005) show that the perception of the ECB's reaction parameter has changed over time as markets developed a view of the ECB's characteristics and the relative weight it assigns to different objectives.
Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union r 2010 The Author German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik comparison (from their economic weight and their number) but have a more than proportionate political weight (Berger, 2006) . However, the externalities that are created through monetary union can be adequately captured with this simplification. It is obvious that the size of spillover effects increases with the relative weight of countries and that if uncertainty is higher in the new members, overall uncertainty in the monetary union will increase in their relative weights. 14 I will discuss the implication of asymmetric sizes below. The objective function of the larger central bank therefore is
where
The rate of inflation is assumed to be equal in both regions and I abstract from asymmetric developments in the rate of inflation due, for instance, to the influence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect, so that p ¼ p. Moreover, I assume E[m 1 ] 5 E[m 2 ] 5 0 and s 2 m ¼ ðs 2 m 1 þ s 2 m 2 Þ=2, so that the stochastic preference parameters are independently distributed. Finally, I assume Covðe 1 ; e 2 Þ ¼ 0 and equal variance of shocks in the two regions of the monetary union s 2 e 1 ¼ s 2 e 2 ¼ s 2 e . 15 The ECB's policy follows from optimizing (9) and by taking rational expectations as
The common central bank reacts to developments in any single member state according to its (equalized) economic weight, thus neglecting asymmetric national developments or differences in the transmission of monetary policy. This applies to structural distortions, t i , as well as to shocks e i and to flexibility in reaction to shocks g i .
Although now there is a common central bank, I assume that governments' policies remain uncoordinated and that national governments decide about their reform efforts without consulting other governments. This is an adequate assumption for the EMU as of now, despite some tentative attempts by the Commission to coordinate member states' policies in the framework of the Lisbon objectives and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines.
Following the same steps as above, structural distortions are a function of the other country's distortions. The reaction function for country i is
Then, equilibrium structural distortions and flexibilities after reforms are
14. Fatum (2006) instead argues that any ECB council is likely to adopt the preferred position of the most conservative member and will thus reflect the Bundesbank's preferred policy. 15. The model thus focuses only on asymmetric shocks. For the present purpose, nothing is gained by allowing for symmetric or correlated shocks as well. 
with b ¼ a þ l 1 þ l þ ðl=2Þ 2 . Like in the case of monetary autonomy, flexibility is determined through the initial degree of distortions, the aversion to reforms, the variability of economic shocks and uncertainty about the central bank's reaction function. As before, it follows that a high variability of economic shocks and central bank reaction are both inducing more flexibility. Because of the assumption that shocks are uncorrelated, flexibility is only affected by national distortions and is independent from those in the other country.
Turning to structural distortions, it is clear that the initial level of structural distortionst i increases the level of distortions after reforms. Moreover, it is apparent that structural reforms are strategic substitutes. In order to avoid that the higher distortions in the other country create too much inflation and higher variability, the domestic government has an incentive to implement more reforms itself, even if there is no uncertainty. The influence of uncertainty is given by @t i =@s 2 m < 0, that is, distortions will decrease with monetary uncertainty. Again, uncertainty is thus inducing more flexibility and lower structural distortions. As before, reforms should compensate for higher variability in inflation and output due to more uncertainty about the central bank's behavior. There is an additional effect now stemming from the other country which could lead to more inflation (and variability) and which is countered appropriately.
The rate of inflation in the monetary union in equilibrium follows as
Again, inflation depends on structural distortions and on shocks in the two countries. Expected inflation, however, only depends on initial structural distortions and can thus readily be compared with the expected inflation before monetary union. It is an indication of whether countries could expect to experience an increase or a decrease of inflation from entering the union. The condition for a fall in inflation E½p N i > E½p MU iŝ
Thus, a single country can expect a fall in the rate of inflation if it enters a monetary union with a country that is sufficiently less distorted than itself. 16 In this case, monetary discipline is imported because the lower distortions in that country lead the common central bank to run a less inflationary policy than the national central bank. Moreover, an increase in uncertainty, s 2 m > s 2 m , will tend to increase inflation because this works as an additional incentive to lower distortions, 16 . Of course, there is only a change in the expected output if a change in distortions t i can be expected.
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THE INFLUENCE OF MONETARY UNION ON REFORMS
As I have argued above, the case of uncertainty is most relevant for the larger monetary union because, in the initial years after enlargement, a larger policymaking organ is likely to create more uncertainty.
From (6) and (12), the condition that EMU leads to more flexibility under monetary union (MU) than with national autonomy (N),
The creation of a monetary union leads countries to implement measures to become more flexible and increase their ability to cope with economic shocks if they 'import' uncertainty to a sufficient degree and are sufficiently averse to output fluctuations. Both will make them keen on reducing output variability which they achieve by making the economy more flexible and adaptable to shocks. Moreover, even if this is not the case, countries have an incentive to increase flexibility because they realize the common central bank will care less for idiosyncratic shocks that hit single countries. 18 Therefore, the only way to cope with such shocks is to make the economy less vulnerable to shocks. However, an exogenous reduction in uncertainty will lead the government to allow more rigidities and less flexibility as compensation, given the ( political) costs of flexibility.
Next, I compare the levels of structural distortion under monetary union. From (5) and (11), one finds that monetary union leads to a reduction in structural
There are again two disciplinary influences from monetary union. An increase in uncertainty will make the government more interested in stabilization of inflation and output, which can be achieved through reducing structural distortions. Moreover, if distortions in the other country are higher, the government is afraid of importing inflationary pressure, and this is hence another reason to reduce domestic distortions. If there is an export of inflationary pressure, the government will allow distortions to increase. There is, in this case, a further polarization in domestic distortions and regulations, and monetary union will hence not lead to convergence. 19 Only a sufficient increase in uncertainty might be able to mitigate part of this negative effect. A high enough degree of uncertainty is an incentive for all countries to implement more structural reforms, even for those that would not implement them without uncertainty. The intuition for the result is straightforward. As has been shown in the earlier literature (Calmfors, 2001; Sibert and Sutherland, 2000) , if structural reforms and monetary policy are considered as substitutes by the government, and if the government is a Stackelberg leader with respect to the central bank, governments implement structural reforms to reduce inflationary pressure. In a monetary union, the central bank will no longer react as strongly to distortions in the home country and this prompts the reform-averse government to reduce its reform efforts. Here, however, it has been demonstrated that this result can be turned around if countries are asymmetric with respect to distortions. Relatively more distorted countries will reduce their reform efforts, whereas the less distorted countries fear the 'import' of inflation and take care to reduce this pressure by implementing even more reforms.
This negative consequence for some of the members of the larger EMU, however, can be avoided if the common central bank is less transparent than national central banks. By deliberately creating uncertainty about its reaction function, structural distortions can be reduced even in countries that are relatively more distorted. While it is certainly not costless to create uncertainty deliberately, the conclusion remains that maximum transparency in a larger ECB can have negative effects for the relatively more distorted member countries.
Turning to the relative size of countries, it is obvious that the spillovers will be largest if the other country has a strong influence on common monetary policy. That is, large countries will be only marginally affected, relatively, by monetary union and there will be little policy change. Small countries are likely to be most affected and change policies a lot. Hence, negative and positive effects from EMU on member countries depend on their relative sizes and how strongly the common central bank will react to them because they influence the European average inflation and output a lot.
CONCLUSION
The paper has demonstrated the reform-inducing effects of uncertainty about the central bank's relative preferences for output and inflation. While this does not invalidate the general positive effects of central bank transparency, clear policy decisions and communication, the paper stresses that there can also be positive effects of preference uncertainty. In a closed economy, uncertainty leads governments to implement more structural reforms and to try to make the economy less vulnerable to economic shocks. In the monetary union, an increase in uncertainty can serve to compensate for negative effects brought about through the union.
In the case of monetary union, it follows that governments have generally an incentive to make their economies more flexible in order to be able to compensate for the less stabilizing influence of the central bank. Since the central bank will react the least to the smallest economies, their incentives to become more flexible in a monetary union are largest. This would predict that the new member states of the EMU will be more flexible in the monetary union than the larger (and older) member states. This might be one possible explanation (among others) why, in general, smaller economies are more flexible than larger ones, and why the difference in these matters between larger and smaller economies has further increased since the start of EMU.
It is less certain that monetary union will also lead to a reduction in structural distortions. Only countries that have relatively low distortions will reduce their Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union r 2010 The Author German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik distortions further, whereas those with high levels of distortions are likely to reduce further their efforts to lower them. Monetary union, according to this model, will hence lead to a further polarization of high and low distortion countries. However, the uncertainty created by the introduction (or extension) of monetary union can potentially counteract this negative influence for high distortion countries.
This general result also has implications for the relative voting weights that individual countries should have in a monetary union. If increasing the relative weight of newcomers leads to more uncertainty about the reaction of the central bank, this effect could be strategically exploited to increase structural reforms in member states. There is, hence, some justification for the 'one country, one vote' principle that the ECB currently applies to its decision-making structure. A full centralization, as has been advocated by some observers, might lead to more efficient decision making but run the risk of decreasing the reform mindedness of (some) governments. Deriving the optimal amount of uncertainty, however, would require having a fuller model that also incorporates the positive effects of lower uncertainty and transparency. Developing such a model is left for further research.
